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 1 
Law, Culture, and the Humanities (forthcoming 2016) 
 
 
JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: 
Activist Judging in the Light of Democratic Constitutionalism and Democratic 
Experimentalism 
 
William H. Simon 
 
 This essay examines the charge that activist judging is inconsistent with 
democracy in the light of two recent perspectives in legal scholarship.  The 
perspectives – Democratic Constitutionalism and Democratic Experimentalism – 
suggest in convergent and complementary ways that the charge ignores or 
oversimplifies relevant features of both judging and democracy.  In particular, 
the charge exaggerates the pre-emptive effect of activist judging, and it 
implausibly conflates democracy with electoral processes.  In addition, it 
understands consensus as a basis for judicial legitimacy solely in terms of pre-
existing agreement and ignores the contingent legitimacy that can arise from 
the potential for subsequent agreement. 
 
 I. Introduction 
 A familiar theme in American legal discourse pits judicial judgments about 
justice against democracy.  Judges, some argue, should not rely on their 
understanding of justice when that understanding is in tension with legislative 
enactments.  A still stronger version challenges the idea that such understanding 
should even guide or supplement interpretation of legislative enactments or 
common law authority.   
 The problem with values of justice according to this critique is that people 
disagree about them.  They agree that certain values, like equality and freedom of 
speech, are important but only at a high level of abstraction.  These general concepts 
do not generate uncontroversial answers to particular issues.  Many powerful 
theories strive to link the general concepts to resolutions of particular cases.  
However, people disagree both about which of these theories is better, and they 
                                                        
  Arthur Levitt Professor of Law, Columbia University.  I gave a version of this essay as a 
lecture at the University of Alabama on April 10, 2015.  I’m grateful to the law school faculty for 
stimulating responses. 
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often disagree within a given theory about which answer to a concrete dispute the 
theory supports. For the critics, there is no way to legitimate judicial judgments 
about justice in the absence of something close to consensus.   
 According to the critique, it is dogmatism or arrogance for judges or the 
relatively educated and affluent class from which they emerge to suggest that they 
have privileged insight into what is good or right.  They have no way to validate 
their premises against the modernist skepticism they themselves deploy against 
beliefs they do not hold.  Imposing such judgments violates the fundamental moral 
duty of contemporary political thought of respect for people with whom one 
disagrees.  Moreover, it seems incompatible with political accountability.  Given 
judges’ relative immunity from political pressure, errors in their decisions cannot be 
readily exposed and redressed. 
 Democracy is one fundamental value to which the critique would have judges 
commit themselves.  They view it as procedural rather than substantive.  They seem 
to believe that democratic values are more widely shared than the substantive 
values they regard as problematical.  But they also make arguments of principle that 
suggest that democracy is one commitment that does not depend on consensus.  
They value democracy because it treats people respectfully as equals.  One-
person/one-vote democracy with universal suffrage and majority decision respects 
equality strongly in principle and at least minimally adequately in practice. 
 We can take Antonin Scalia, John Ely, and Jeremy Waldron as familiar 
examples of this critique.1  The reach of their positions varies.  Ely and Waldron are 
largely concerned with judicial review, and Ely concedes a broader role than 
Waldron for courts in reviewing legislation that impairs the democratic process.  
Scalia conceives a broader role than Waldron for courts in reviewing legislation that 
impinges on textually grounded constitutional norms, but unlike Ely’s and 
Waldron’s, his critique of judicial resort to informal values of justice extends to 
                                                        
1  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 999-1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Antonin 
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1997; John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review, Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1980; Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review”, Yale 
L.aw Journal, 115 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000. 
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ordinary interpretation of legislation as well as judicial review.  Nevertheless, there 
is a basic common ground among the three: the idea that legitimacy must come 
either from consensus or democracy and the consequent belief that judicial 
judgments in hard cases grounded in ideals of justice are unlikely to be legitimate.   
The critique is important because it captures widespread anxieties, first, about the 
public grounding of moral judgments, and second about the exercise of power by 
judges.  Yet, although people often invoke its arguments against judicial decisions 
they reject, few embrace them consistently.  
 We can get insight into the limitations of the critique by contrasting its 
treatment of judicial activism with two other perspectives in recent legal 
scholarship -- Democratic Constitutionalism (DC) and Democratic Experimentalism 
(DE).  The former is exemplified by the work of Bruce Ackerman, Reva Siegel, and 
various collaborators;2 the latter is exemplified by the work of Charles Sabel and 
various collaborators.3  These two perspectives share with the critique doubts that 
judicial authority can be secured by abstract normative theorizing or doctrinal 
heuristics.  They also share a desire to square judicial independence with 
democracy.  But DC and DE, in common or complementary ways, suggest that the 
critique oversimplifies its account of activist judging and present an argument for it 
that responds to at least some of the critics’ concerns.   
 In particular, DC and DE challenge the critique along three dimensions. 
 First, they suggest that the critique exaggerates and mischaracterizes the 
pre-emptive power of courts.  Judges do exercise power in important ways, but the 
                                                        
2  E.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Civil Rights Revolution, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 
2014; Reva Siegel, “Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The 
Case of the De Facto ERA”, California Law Review, 94 (2006).  The term “popular constitutionalism” 
might also be applied to this perspective, but that term is often associated with a different view that 
contemplates a much more limited role for courts than DC. See Robert Post and Reva Siegel, “Roe 
Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 42 
(2007), p. 373 (distinguishing the “popular constitutionalism” of Larry Kramer and others from DC). 
3  E.g., Michael C. Dorf and Charles F. Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism”, 
Columbia Law Review, 98 (1998); Joshua Cohen and Charles F. Sabel, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 
European Law Journal, 3 (1997); Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: 
Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 
Michigan Law Review, 110 (2012). 
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exercise is more provisional and contingent and more subject to accountability 
mechanisms than the critics allow.   
 Second, the conception of democracy that the critics oppose to activist 
judging is too narrow.  It focuses exclusively on electoral and legislative processes 
and ignores civil society, in particular, social movement and stakeholder 
engagement.  These latter processes respond to a somewhat different, but 
nevertheless compelling, conception of democratic equality from the one invoked by 
the critics.  Activist judging can potentially both induce and be disciplined by such 
processes. 
 Third, the critics’ idea of consensus is too limited.  They assume that 
legitimation requires a pre-existing consensus.  Yet, judicial intervention can induce 
debate and deliberation that leads to consensus.  Such induced consensus can 
legitimate retrospectively, and the prospect of it can provide a kind of provisional 
legitimacy.   
 II.  Democratic Constitutionalism 
 Brown v. Board of Education is a problem for the critics.  The correctness of 
Brown is the bedrock of American rights discourse.  There is disagreement about its 
implications in many situations, but no one can expect to be taken seriously in 
rejecting the case’s holding that racially segregated public facilities violate 
constitutional equal protection.  If there is anything about public law that Americans 
agree on, it includes this.  Justice Rehnquist and other conservatives of his 
generation had to distance themselves strenuously from their early criticism of the 
ruling.4  Herbert Wechsler’s negative assessment, which was once considered the 
height of sophistication, is virtually unintelligible today.5 
 Moreover, the antidiscrimination understanding that has been accepted as 
foundational in American public law extends beyond the Brown holding. It 
condemns racially-based exclusion from, in addition to education, other public 
                                                        
4  Adam Liptak, New Look at an Old Memo Casts More Doubt on Rehnquist, New York Times 
(March 19, 2012). 
5  Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harvard L. Rev. 1, 
(1959). 
 5 
services, the electoral process, public and private employment, “public” 
accommodations even when privately owned, and state-sanctioned marriage and 
family relations.  This non-discrimination principle extends to disadvantages based 
on ethnicity and religion as well.  To be sure, controversy remains about some 
applications.  There is intense debate about the legality of affirmative action and of 
activity with “disparate impact” (decisions based on neutral criteria that have 
foreseeably disproportionate effects on protected groups.)  But there is a large core 
that rests on consensus. 
 The Brown core is the most important, but it is not the only example of 
judicially-declared doctrine of substantive justice that has gained virtual consensus 
status.  Consider, for example, the “de facto Equal Rights Amendment”.  The Equal 
Rights Amendment was never enacted as an Article V amendment, but something 
very close to the norms its proponents thought the amendment would mandate 
have become law through other means, including judicial decision. There has been 
little public dissent from a core set of gender-equity norms since Robert Bork was 
denied confirmation of his Supreme Court nomination after criticizing the Supreme 
Court cases interpreting the 14th amendment equal protection guarantees to apply 
to gender discrimination.  The core of the de facto ERA is presumptively equal 
access for women to education and employment, as expressed in strict scrutiny of 
gender classifications.  Not included in the core are claims to supportive services 
such as childcare or abortion rights.   
 It is possible that we are witnessing the formation of another consensus of 
principle around state neutrality toward sexual identity.  Fighting continues around 
gay marriage, but the age break-down in reported views suggests that it will not be 
long before consensus arrives. 
 The troubling feature of these examples, and especially the Brown core, for 
the critique is that they are matters of substantive justice.  If the most agreed-upon 
principle in American public law – the Brown core -- is substantive, that presents at 
the very least a big counter-example to the critics’ picture of disagreement about 
justice as a starting point for constitutional theory.   
 6 
 The critics have recognized this problem and responded by trying to 
characterize Brown in other ways.  Most notably, Ely sought to explain Brown as a 
response to a procedural defect in majoritarian democracy – the role of prejudice in 
subverting legislators from fair consideration of the interests of minorities.  But the 
argument was widely considered unsuccessful, and few advance it today.  The basic 
problem is that it is hard to distinguish in procedural terms the kind prejudice to 
which Brown responded from myriad other kinds that do not raise constitutional 
problems (for example, prejudice against burglars) without resort to substantive 
values.6  In another effort to ground Brown without resort to substantive values, 
Michael McConnell tried to show that Brown could be understood in originalist 
terms of the sort defended by Justice Scalia, but again, the effort has not proved 
broadly persuasive.7  Of course, Ely and McConnell were not doing this work to 
support Brown.  Brown needed no support. They were working to shore up their 
non-substantive approaches by showing that they were compatible with Brown.   
 Brown, as well as the gender-equity core, are best understood as substantive, 
and they rest on a powerful base of social agreement.  But of course, this agreement 
did not legitimate judicial action in the manner contemplated by the critics.  It did 
not pre-exist the judicial decisions.  Indeed, there was massive and sometimes 
violent contestation around them.  The consensus emerged from this conflict.  
Consensus did not produce the judicial decisions; it was in substantial part 
produced by them. 
 Democratic Constitutionalism has analyzed the process by which 
constitutional principle becomes entrenched in this manner.  The key processes are 
different from those portrayed by the critics.  The critics contrast a pre-emptive 
mandate imposed by a court with one enacted by a democratically constituted 
                                                        
6  “Processual prejudice is a pervasive problem in the American political system….  Carolene 
cannot justify its concern with discrete and insular minorities without calling on judges to engage in 
a very different kind of judgment, one dealing with the substance of racial and religious prejudice. “  
Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 939-40 (1985); see also Paul Brest, 
The Substance of Process, 42 Ohio St. L. J. 131 (1981). 
7  Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Virginia L. Rev. 947 
(1995): Michael J. Klarman, Originalism and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 
81 Virginia L. Rev. 1937 (1995). 
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legislature.  In the DC account, basic constitutional norms emerge from interaction 
among all three branches and between government and the People, acting both as 
electorate and civil society.   
 Judicial decisions state the law in a partial fashion.  They typically permit or 
require substantive elaboration and enforcement processes that the executive and 
legislative branches are best equipped to provide.  These other branches have ample 
opportunity to advance or resist the courts’ projects.  If the process is salient and 
sufficiently prolonged, it will become a subject of electoral debate and contention.  
Legislative and executive activity will feed back on the agenda of the courts.  All 
three branches will respond to experiences of enforcement.  Election returns will 
influence legislatures directly and courts indirectly.  At the same time, social 
movement activism will influence the electoral process and informal public 
deliberative processes.   
  The court’s role in this picture is not as strongly pre-emptive as the critics 
tend to portray it.  In the long run, a court cannot prevail over persistent widespread 
opposition.  The court will be compelled to back up, even to reverse itself, or its 
pronouncements will become dead letter.  Conversely, entrenchment requires 
support from all three branches and validation in elections.   
 Southern racists talked as if the Supreme Court had dictated abandonment of 
apartheid.  But properly understood, at most, it merely shifted the burden of 
democratic contestation.  They could have prevailed by capturing the three 
branches of government in a series of elections, as the New Dealers had done to 
reverse the laissez-faire Constitution of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  In 
order to do that, they would have to engage their fellow citizens over the issues.  
Moreover, the range of issues as to which the burden was shifted was ambiguous.  
What Brown meant beyond condemnation of de jure segregation and even the scope 
of the idea of de jure segregation was left open.  Supporters who wanted to establish 
an expansive understanding of constitutional equality had ample reason to mobilize 
on their own initiative. 
 Bruce Ackerman’s account emphasizes inter-branch engagement and the role 
of the electorate.  The Brown core developed in judicial decisions over two decades.  
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They were complemented by high-profile executive initiatives, including executive 
orders and agency rule-making, as well as threats and sanctions against recalcitrant 
state officials and physical protection of demonstrators against lawless violence.  
Congress intervened with a series of statutes, including two “super statutes”: the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  The statutes created new 
opportunities for private enforcement and empowered the executive branch to 
enforce them in new ways.  The core was a focus of debate in the Presidential 
election of 1964, and Johnson’s landslide victory was a major step in the 
entrenchment of the core.  Consolidation was advanced following the election of 
1968, when Nixon made clear that, notwithstanding his hostility to much of the 
liberal agenda of his predecessor, he accepted the Brown core.  The two super-
statutes were revised in the 1970s in ways designed, for the most part, to 
strengthen them. 
 As Ackerman’s account emphasizes the interaction of official initiative and 
the electoral process, Reva Siegel’s account of the de facto ERA emphasizes the role 
of engagement in civil society.  The ERA inspired a movement for gender-equity and 
a counter-movement that sought to limit its ambitions.  The amendment failed, in 
part because of its ambiguity about key issues on which there was strong division, 
such as childcare entitlement and abortion rights.  But a core of norms prescribing 
equal access to employment and education took root.  The Supreme Court played a 
role by developing a jurisprudence that treated gender as a suspect classification (a 
holding unwarranted by either originalist or proceduralist premises).  Again, there 
were complementary statutes and executive initiatives.  Siegel shows the contours 
of the core emerging in the discourse of social movement and counter-movement.  
ERA proponents moderated their positions when confronted by protests that their 
views devalued traditional family norms and implied a cumbersome expansion of 
the welfare state.  Their concessions facilitated the emergence of the core.    
 The disciplinary pressures of social movements reach the courts.  Some of 
this pressure is communicated through legislatures.  When courts act pre-emptively 
to hold statutes invalid, they are frequently acting against outlier jurisdictions and 
can appeal to strong state legislative trends.  Social movement pressure can also act 
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more directly.  Siegel has shown that the shape of the courts doctrine on both the de 
facto ERA and the still controversial Second Amendment owe much more to social 
movement discourse than to formal legal authority.8 
 Siegel sees deliberation as an imporant mechanism of consensus formation.  
In her account the key feature of deliberation is the pressure to understand and 
respond to views opposed to one’s own.  “The quest to win public confidence and to 
capture sites of norm articulation disciplines change agents, leading them to 
internalize elements of counterarguments and to other implicit forms of 
convergence and compromise.”9   
 Thus, DC suggests that courts often do well to configure doctrine over hotly 
contested issues in ways that promote deliberative engagement.  While Siegel is 
ambivalent about recent authority on abortion and affirmative action, she argues 
that the use of conditional standards in cases like Planned Parenthood v. Casey,10 and 
Ricci v. DeStefano11 has desirable effects in inducing continuing discussion of the 
issues.12  In Casey, the Court backed off of some of the categorical strictures of Roe v. 
Wade in favor a general standard: the prohibition of “undue burden” on the choice 
to have an abortion.  In its affirmative action cases, the court has refused to either 
categorically permit or categorically prohibit racially conscious decision-making 
designed to promote inclusion.  Rather than condemning abortion regulation and 
affirmative action outright, they specify the legitimate purposes of such measures 
and then require that the measures be narrowly tailored to such purposes.  The 
effect is to encourage both debate and experiment over the elaboration of the 
standards.  Such contestation seems desirable in two ways.  First, it holds out the 
possible that some form of consensus may emerge.  Second, even where they do not 
prevail, it gives participants a sense of connection to the processes of decision. 
                                                        
8  Siegel, “De Facto ERA”; Reva Siegel, “Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism 
in Heller,” Harvard Law Review, 122 (2009). 
9  Siegel, “De Facto ERA”, p, 1406. 
10  505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
11  129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009). 
12  Post and Siegel, “Roe Rage”; Reva Siegel, “From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An 
Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases”, Yale Law Journal, 120 (2011). 
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 The Democratic Constitutionalist picture blurs the distinction between 
strong and “weak form” judicial review that has become salient recently.  In weak 
form review, as exemplified in Canada or the United Kingdom, the Court can declare 
a statute unconstitutional, but the legislature can nullify the holding by enacting a 
new statute explicitly overriding it.  In practice, however, legislatures in these 
systems seem reluctant to do this.13  In the nominally pre-emptive American system, 
a judicial decision can have some effect over persistent, widespread popular 
opposition for some period of time.  Roe is the prominent modern example.  But this 
effect is limited in scope and (most likely) in time.  
 From the point of view of democratic legitimacy, activist judging can be 
considered in three categories. 
 First, some of the courts’ decisions purport to reinforce the democratic 
character of the political process.  Ely’s proceduralist theory allowed for  
“representation-reinforcing” review.  His vision of democracy was focused on 
elections.  So the interventions he defended most vigorously were First Amendment 
protections of political speech and application of equal protection norms to the 
voting process.   
 Democratic Constitutionalism has a broader vision of the political process 
that implies a broader conception of procedural preconditions.  It values free 
speech, not just as essential to electoral accountability, but also as safeguarding the 
process of popular consensus formation.   Consensus formation requires 
opportunities for organized deliberative engagement outside as well as inside 
government.  It also requires opportunity to protest against prevailing views.  
Consensus is a basis for legitimacy only when it is voluntary and reflective.  
Legitimacy is enhanced when positions are subjected to the “full blast” of competing 
views. 
 At the same time, DC values organizational efforts that induce and facilitate 
extra-electoral deliberative engagement.  Thus, it should accord prominent place in 
the canon to the decisions that protected social movement initiative.  The Supreme 
                                                        
13  Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in 
Comparative Perspective, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. 
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Court struck down bar regulations that prevented movement organizations from 
supporting or coordinating lawsuits brought by individuals, invalidated 
maintenance and champerty rules that banned solicitation of potential litigants; 
protected the privacy of organizational member and contributor lists; and carved 
out a space for public demonstrations and concerted economic pressure against 
trespass, disorderly conduct, and economic conspiracy rules. 14  
 Ely’s argument was that the critique of judicial activism should not apply to 
“representation-reinforcing” decisions because the critique presupposes a 
democratic legislature.  A judicial decision that imposes a condition of democracy on 
the political process cannot be criticized as undemocratic.  Or at least, such a 
decision is democratic in effect if not in origin.  The argument is appealing, but one 
can see why critics like Scalia and Waldron are wary of it. Most claims about 
substantive justice could be packed into conceptions of democracy, and the 
concession could thus end up swallowing the critique.  This is not a problem for DC, 
however, because it defends activist judging inspired by substantive values. 
    The second of the DC categories of activist intervention involves the 
enforcement of a dominant trend against outliers.  Cases like Gideon v. Wainwright15, 
requiring appointed counsel for criminal defendants, and Griswold v. Connecticut16, 
striking down contraceptive prohibition, followed growing and widespread support 
for their principles in federal and state statutes and judicial decisions.   The Court’s 
constitutional holdings thus rested on incomplete but emerging consensuses.  Such 
decisions follow broad national deliberation in circumstances where there is ample 
evidence of broad national support for them.   
 The third and most challenging category of activism involves cases like 
Brown where the court takes an initiative on the basis of a substantive value without 
the support of a dominant trend or emerging consensus.  DC defends such cases in 
part as deliberation-inducing.   These cases do not categorically preempt democracy 
                                                        
14  E.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963): NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 
(1958); In re Primus, 436 US. 412 (1978);  NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 US. 886 (1982). 
15  372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
16  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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in the manner the critique implies.  They do involve the exercise of power, but this 
power takes the form of three kinds of more modest and contingent effects.  First, 
the court may have prestige due to features of the judicial role – political 
independence, disinterestedness, reason-giving – and this prestige may give 
persuasive force to its views.  Second, the court exercises agenda control.  It creates 
a focus of public deliberation and forces officials to address issues they would have 
preferred to ignore or defer.  Brown forced political leaders like Presidents 
Eisenhower and Kennedy, who were sympathetic to racial equality but who might 
otherwise have been inclined to ignore or downplay the issue, to address it saliently 
and concretely.  Third, the court can shift the burden of initiative.  Opponents can no 
longer remain passive and enjoy the status quo; they must affirmatively mobilize to 
secure what they want.  It is generally harder to enact a new rule than to block 
change of an old one in any system, and more than usually so in the American.  Thus, 
the shifting of the burden can be highly significant. 
 It is not clear how much this revised picture of judicial activism would 
placate the critics even if they accepted its descriptive accuracy.  The critique 
objects most strongly to categorically pre-emptive judicial decisions.  It sometimes 
suggests that, as long as judicial decisions can be reversed by new legislation, the 
value of democracy is satisfied.  On this view, there is room for quite a bit of 
activism.  But the critics would be right to point out that the powers that the court 
exercises in even “weak form” review are substantial, and they are not democratic in 
the distinctive sense emphasized by the critics of affording equal opportunities for 
participation for all citizens.  On the other hand, it would be difficult to deprive the 
judiciary of some measure of these powers, and doing so would not necessarily 
contribute to a more democratic system.  Public officials have the potential to 
acquire influence through prestige of office in any system.  It is doubtful whether 
there is any viable system of agenda-setting that respects the critics’ equality 
principle.  And the power to shift the status quo is in tension with democracy only if 
the status quo has some democratic warrant.  Often it will not.  The status quo may 
be the product of some long-ago legislation that persists more through inertia than 
popular support.  Or it may simply be a matter of informal social custom and power 
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relations reinforced by background laws that regulate property and general social 
action.  
 III. Democratic Experimentalism 
 Constitutional theory tends to pause when key principles and paradigm cases 
have been accepted and political mobilization has waned.  But much work remains 
to be done.  At this point, both the nature of the task and the processes of addressing 
it have changed.  We are no longer concerned with entrenchment so much as 
elaboration.  Disputes are less likely to involve general principles than their 
application to varied and incompletely understood circumstances.  The institutional 
configuration of citizen engagement may also have changed.  As the intensity of 
informal social movement recedes, it leaves behind newly strengthened 
organizations that can continue to engage in a more focused and structured manner. 
 Democratic Experimentalism has been especially interested in activities at 
this stage.  Like DC, DE appeals to deliberative engagement and potential consensus 
as a path to legitimation.  But it focuses on institutional processes that are more 
formal than social movement activism and less comprehensive than general 
elections and legislation.  The key institutions might be called contextualizing 
regimes. 
 Consider what some call “second generation” race discrimination, or more 
generally, civil rights problems.  First generation law focused on consciously and 
explicitly invidious discrimination or, in related areas such as the Fourth 
Amendment, egregiously reckless conduct.  By contrast, second generation issues 
arise from conduct that is not invidiously motivated or egregiously reckless but is 
foreseeably disproportionately harmful to groups or values protected by civil rights 
law.  Disparate impact discrimination claims are a key example.   
 A disparate impact claimant challenges a practice, such as a college-degree 
requirement for a job, that foreseeably disadvantages a protected group.  The 
plaintiff may assert that the requirement was motivated by a desire to achieve this 
effect and is thus merely a disguised form of invidious discrimination.  The 
defendant responds by adducing non-discriminatory grounds that might justify the 
practice.  In the employment context, she might say that the requirement correlates 
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with higher productivity.  From the plaintiff’s point of view, traditional doctrine is 
unsatisfactory because the existence of a possible legitimate ground does not mean 
that the decision was not influenced by discriminatory sentiment.  Experimental 
psychology has taught that racial preconceptions are pervasive but, in the post-
Brown era, often unconscious and nearly always unacknowledged.  However, if 
doctrine permits an inference of discrimination from foreseeably disparate impact, 
it may put the defendant in an unfair situation.  Since it is often impossible to 
conclusively demonstrate the productivity effects of an employment requirement, 
cases will often be decided by the allocation of the burden of proof.  The losing party 
often feels that he lost because of unrealistic evidentiary burdens. 
 An important response to such difficulties emphasizes notions such as “less 
restrictive alternative” and “reasonable accommodation”.17  Under the strong 
versions of these requirements, where there are alternative practices that serve the 
defendant’s legitimate purposes while doing less harm to protected groups or 
values, the defendant should adopt them.  Where doctrine remains focused on 
intent, the reason to adopt mitigating measures is to escape an inference that the 
more burdensome practice was invidiously motivated.  But in the more demanding 
versions, intent is no longer the touchstone.  The duty to assess impact of practices 
on protected groups and to search for less burdensome alternatives becomes a core 
element of the duty of equal protection. 
 Second-generation civil rights issues are part of a broader class of issues that 
confront the modern state characterized by variation and fluidity.  Democratic 
experimentalism views these conditions as calling for responses customized to local 
contexts or revised more or less continuously as new understanding accrues.  In 
                                                        
17  The “less restrictive alternative” principle, which warrants an inference of discrimination 
from the defendant’s failure to adopt a measure that serves its purposes but does less harm, plays a 
role in doctrine under Titles VI, and VII of the Civil Rights Act.  The “reasonable accommodation” 
requirement, which requires affirmative mitigation of conditions that disproportionately burden 
protected groups is most salient in the Americans with Disabilities Act.  It also plays a role in the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Family Medical Leave Act.  See Noah Zatz, “Managing the 
Macaw: Third Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent”, 
Columbia Law Review, 109 (2009); Susan Sturm, “Second Generation Employment Discrimination”, 
Columbia Law Review, 101 (2001); Pamela Perry, “Two Faces of Disparate Impact Discrimination”, 59 
Fordham Law Review, 59 (1995).   
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these situations, neither ends nor means may be fully clear prior to intervention.  
Thus, intervention must be provisional, and it must take the form in part of 
investigation.   In regimes of this kind, a central institution authorizes and oversees 
local experimentation within uniform parameters.  Local initiatives are transparent 
and their effects are routinely assessed.  The center holds the local units accountable 
to the parameters and aggregates information about local efforts.  Local initiatives 
are developed through stakeholder deliberations.  So initially, general principles are 
elaborated locally in varied ways.  But there remains the possibility that as some 
local initiatives gain recognition, their premises will come to be widely shared and 
eventually may be incorporated into the uniform framework. 
 Local investigation in experimentalist regimes typically involves stakeholder 
deliberation.  Such deliberation has an instrumental rationale.  Stakeholders have 
information that officials cannot easily gather without engaging them, and 
implementation may require cooperation by stakeholders that engagement may 
induce.  But there is also a democratic rationale.  Stakeholder deliberation is a form 
of self-government, one that focuses more concretely than general elections or 
legislatures on problems that affect the participating citizens. 
 Civil rights issues in juvenile detention provide an example.  Pretrial 
detention is constitutionally permissible only on the basis of demonstrable risk that 
the defendant will fail to appear for trial or will re-offend if left at large.  In addition, 
detention decisions must be race-neutral.  Yet, many studies conclude that decisions 
do not correlate with indicators of risk and that they are racially biased.  The studies 
are usually controversial, however, and it is typically open to defendants to argue 
that the data is inadequate or improperly measured or that relevant variables have 
been omitted.  Moreover, even if inappropriate detention could be established 
through aggregate data, the consequent remedy might be controversial.  It would 
not be enough to order the defendants to detain only where the risks justified it or 
to stop discriminating.  It would be necessary to tell them how to do so, and there 
would likely be controversy at that stage. 
 In recent years, federal legislation and foundation initiatives have produced a 
distinctive approach to the problem.   Courts have not participated in this 
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development in the pre-emptive manner that the critics worry about.  But the 
development exemplifies a conception of right that seems to moot the critics’ 
objections to judicial intervention.  As we will see, the courts have intervened in 
activist fashion in other areas on the basis of this conception. 
 With respect to racial disparities, local juvenile justice agencies are obliged 
under the emergent regime to measure the racial incidence of decisions that 
potentially lead to detention, and when they find disparities, to develop plans for 
mitigating them.  The Department of Justice and the Annie E. Casey Foundation 
provide technical assistance and prescribe metrics for measuring disparities.  These 
efforts, known as the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI), have 
generated a network of state and local agencies that involves about half of the 
relevant agencies in the country.  The agencies pool information and engage in 
various informal modes of peer review. 
 JDAI has transformed the process of juvenile detention in the past quarter 
century.  Detention has fallen dramatically during this period.  While aggregate 
racial disparities have persisted, they have fallen in some localities, and since 
minorities are over-represented in detention, the aggregate reduction has benefited 
them disproportionately.18 
 Two elements of this transformation are especially interesting.  One is the 
replacement of informal probation officer judgments about pretrial detention with 
empirically validated risk assessment instruments.  The instruments dictate a 
decision on the basis of scores determined by objective factors such as prior 
offenses or the availability of an adult to take responsibility for the child.  (The 
numerical scores can be over-ridden where the official believes the instrument does 
not adequately account for some aspect of the situation but only with supervisor 
                                                        
18  Detention has fallen in non-JDAI sites as well, but there is some evidence that it has fallen 
more in JDAI sites.  The comparison is difficult in part because many non-JDAI sites have adopted 
reforms emphasized in JDAI. Barry Krisberg, JDAI Sites and States 2011 (Chief Justice Earl Warren 
Center Institute on Law and Social Policy 2012).  On JDAI in general, see Sabel and Simon, cited in 
note,  at 21-28; Annie E. Casey Foundation, Two Decades of JDAI: From Demonstration Project to 
National Standard (2009).   The importance of local stakeholder participation in JDAI is argued in 
James Bell et all, The Keeper and the Kept: Reflections on Local Obstacles to Disparities Reduction in 
Juvenile Justice Systems and a Path to Change (W. Heywood Burns Foundation 2009). 
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approval and subsequent review.)  Agencies are supposed to validate their 
instruments on the basis of data from their own and others’ experience.  Each 
criterion is tested for its power to predict the consequences that justify detention – 
re-offense and failure to appear in court. 
 The other key JDAI practice has to do with the attempt to diagnose the 
sources of racial disparity and find ways to mitigate them.  A mundane but 
potentially important example concerns notification and transportation initiatives.  
Some jurisdictions have achieved major reductions in failures to appear by routinely 
telephoning parents prior to a scheduled appearance, reminding them of the date, 
and telling them exactly where the child should appear and what to expect.  
Sometimes, notification is coupled with an offer of transportation.  In Santa Cruz 
County, California, Latinos are concentrated around Watsonville in the southern 
part of the county, while the courthouse is located in a sparsely developed area of 
the north poorly served by public transportation.  When the probation department 
inaugurated a bus service from Watsonville to the courthouse, failures to appear 
dropped significantly. 
 More complex mitigation strategies involve the development of less 
restrictive forms of supervision than incarceration.  Electronic monitoring is a 
technology-based example.  Others, such as after-school reporting centers, 
mentoring or coaching programs, and substance abuse treatment, involve social 
services.  The reasonableness of a decision to detain will depend substantially on the 
availability of such alternatives.  A community that fails to develop them will have 
more occasions to incarcerate.  Individual decisions may seem reasonable viewed in 
isolation, but the community’s failure to develop its institutions may seem 
unreasonable when viewed in terms of its aggregate effects on incarceration.  (Thus, 
do negative rights to liberty shade into positive rights to government services.) 
 JDAI prescribes an evidence-based approach to reform.  Agencies must 
specify metrics for assessing the success of their initiatives and periodically re-
assess them in the light of experience.  They must establish inter-agency and 
interdisciplinary collaborations.  Typically, criminal justice agencies form 
collaborations with social service agencies and private service providers.  And 
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continuous consultation with community leaders and organizations over both 
detention criteria and alternatives is standard.  
 Viewed as a process of rights elaboration, JDAI has two stages.  In the first 
stage, responsible officials have a duty to assess the effects of their practices on 
relevant civil rights values and to scan for less harmful alternative practices.  The 
second stage occurs once experimentation produces consensus around specific 
interventions.  At this point, officials have a duty to adopt proven interventions 
unless they can articulate plausible reasons why they would not be effective in their 
circumstances. 
 JDAI illustrates a process of consensus formation over constitutional 
elaboration.  The mechanism of the process is slightly different from the one 
emphasized in DC.  DC most often portrays movement toward agreement arising 
from the pressure to provisionally identify with an antagonist’s perspective in order 
to respond to her concerns in the context of a commitment to a common 
constitution.  In DE, progress is more often portrayed as coming from pressure to 
dissolve abstract assertions of value or position into more concrete propositions, 
the discovery of common ground among these more concrete propositions, and the 
subjection some propositions to empirical testing.  The course by which vague 
general judgments about dangerousness were translated into concrete propositions 
and then tested systematically is an example. 
 Litigation has not played a strong direct role in the JDAI process.  Courts have 
participated as partners in the administrative coalitions that have designed the 
reforms, and they have implemented the reforms in individual case decisions. They 
have not, however, mandated them as a matter of equal protection doctrine.   The 
Department of Justice has primary enforcement responsibility and it has favored 
informal pressure over litigation. 19 
 We do, however, find courts imposing analogous remedies in institutional 
reform cases in such areas as schools, policing, prisons, and housing.  The process in 
                                                        
19    Private enforcement is inhibited by Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), which 
refused to recognize a private right of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
forbids discrimination by federal grantees.  Other authority that might support judicial challenges 
remains, but it may be less hospitable than Title VI to disparate impact claims.   
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these cases is another example of the complex relation of substance and process, 
judicial judgment and extra-judicial deliberation.20 
 Typically, the plaintiffs will prove a series of individual instances of official 
conduct they allege violate civil rights.  The child welfare agency maintains children 
in foster placements where they are under-nourished.  Police officers use deadly 
force to stop fleeing unarmed people suspected of nonviolent crimes.  A prison 
places prisoners in long-term solitary confinement as punishment for disrespect to 
guards.  The court makes a substantive judgment in each of these instances as to 
whether the conduct is permissible under statutes or the Constitution.  The 
constitutional and statutory norms overlap and both tend to be stated in terms of 
very general substantive values like equality, due process, or cruel and unusual 
punishment.  These are clearly the kinds of judgments about which the critics are 
uneasy. 
 But these judgments are rarely the controversial part of the cases.  Most 
often, when the court finds liability in these individual cases, its judgments are 
supported by broadly shared popular sentiment or by professional standards that 
the defendants often concede are applicable.  Controversy arises at one or all of the 
next stages.  In the immediate next stage, the court determines whether these 
incidents, in combination with evidence of general administrative practice and 
structure, indicate that violations are systemic and warrant structural relief.  In the 
next stage, the court enters a remedial order.  And then finally, the court determines 
when there has been sufficient compliance with the order to terminate the 
intervention. 
 Once a systemic violation is found, the case starts to play out in a manner 
that strongly resembles the JDAI process.  The court orders the defendants to 
negotiate a remedial regime with the plaintiffs.  With surprising frequency, 
                                                        
20  See Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds”, Harvard Law Review, 117 (2004); Kathleen Noonan, Charles F. Sabel and 
William H. Simon, “Legal Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child 
Welfare Reform”, Law & Social Inquiry, 34 (2009); Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, “The Duty 
of Responsible Administration and The Problem of Police Accountability”, Yale Journal on Regulation, 
33 (2016). 
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defendants prove willing to do so without much coercion, but where necessary, the 
court will push with a threat of some harsh default remedy such as contempt 
sanctions or the closing of a program or facility.  The parties then typically produce 
a decree that the court confirms. 
 When the decrees contain substantive provisions, such as limits on cell size 
or requirements that children in foster care get medical examinations, the 
provisions are often based on standards from professional organizations.  Then the 
decrees will provide for extensive monitoring and reporting.  And further, they 
provide for re-assessment of practices in the light of the experience shown in the 
monitoring. 
 Two sorts of controversy are common.  The defendants and their supporters 
often object to structural relief on the ground that it would interfere with 
democratic processes.  And they often object to particular remedial provisions on 
the ground that they are not entailed by the substantive violations the court has 
found.  For example, they might object to a requirement that police carry body 
cameras on the ground that there are many ways to monitor misconduct and the 
court’s findings of substantive violations do not require this particular remedy.  
These objections resemble the points that the critique makes against preemptive 
judicial review.  While structural injunctions limit executive rather than legislative 
power, they too involve the constraint of elected officials by democratically 
unaccountable judges. 
 The way rights get elaborated in JDAI and institutional reform litigation has 
resemblances to Democratic Constitutionalism, and the responses in Democratic 
Constitutionalism to concerns about democracy overlap those in Democratic 
Experimentalism.   
 To begin with, as in DC, the Experimentalist interventions involve a vision of 
democracy reinforcement that goes beyond Ely’s electoral view.  As DC emphasizes 
the importance of social movements, DE emphasizes the importance of stakeholder 
participation.  Statutes like Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, which 
underpins the JDAI, encourage local agencies to engage stakeholders in devising 
solutions to specified problems.  Structural injunctions pressure defendants to 
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engage with the plaintiffs and other stakeholders and frequently mandate 
participatory processes explicitly. 
 In litigation, the rationale for the court’s mandate is that the substantive 
violations found in the liability determination demonstrate a failure to take account 
of interests of stakeholder constituencies and consequently a defect in the 
democratic process.  Substantive violations are treated as symptoms of democratic 
failings.21 
 In addition, as in Democratic Constitutionalism, intervention is often 
supported by an emerging consensus and has the effect of codifying or consolidating 
it.  Many institutional reform decrees force outlier institutions to adopt practices 
widely viewed elsewhere as standard.  For example, some of the early prison cases 
dealt with prisons that still employed the system by which guards delegated 
disciplinary authority to inmate “trusties”.  The system had been abandoned 
throughout most of the country and was widely condemned within the corrections 
profession.  A series of decrees prohibiting it in recalcitrant institutions basically 
codified this view.22  In juvenile justice, the practice of validated risk assessment 
instruments and detention alternatives such as electronic monitoring seem to be 
emerging as consensus norms.  Were a plaintiff to show repeated instances of 
substantive violations by an agency that lacked such practices, a court would have a 
substantial basis on which to order them. 
  Next, structural intervention has deliberation-inducing tendencies analogous 
to those portrayed in DC.  At their most pre-emptive, the courts impose substantive 
rulings directly.  They may rule that a certain level of prison crowding or the 
punitive imposition of solitary confinement violates the Eighth Amendment, for 
example.  Here the court puts the weight of its authority most strongly behind 
propositions of substantive justice.  But again, such propositions are subject to 
political contestation.  The court’s rulings can become a subject of debate in civil 
                                                        
21  In a manner analogous to that proposed in Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, The Miner’s 
Canary: Enlisting Race, Resisting Power, Transforming Democracy (2002). 
22  See David Zaring, “National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional 
Reform”, UCLA Law Review, 51 (2004). 
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society and the electoral process, and the other branches can respond either 
supportively or in opposition.  Prison decrees, in particular, have engendered 
extensively controversy and legislative response.  In consequence, the courts have 
increased the burdens on plaintiffs to establish liability and have tailored decrees 
more narrowly.  But a set of core principles and interventions seems to have been 
established.23 
 However, a striking characteristic of structural interventions is their 
tendency to refrain from specifying substantive duties categorically and instead to 
mandate directly that officials engage with stakeholders.  Defendants are induced to 
negotiate with plaintiffs both over the terms of the decree and throughout its life 
over issues of compliance.  Judicial decrees typically mandate various types of 
deliberative engagement directly.  For example, the recent federal decree against 
the New York City police department requires the department to hold a series of 
community forums to explain the decree and seek suggestions for its 
implementations.  Police decrees typically contain provisions prescribing the 
operation of civilian complaint bodies and, sometimes, of more proactive citizen 
oversight processes.   The Department of Justice, which has negotiated consent 
decrees with police departments throughout the country, has played a role in 
facilitating the exchange of information and developing standards across 
jurisdictions. 
 Judicial practice in this regard takes a form similar to what Congress 
mandated by statute in the juvenile justice area.  The Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention Act encourages deliberation in various ways.  Agencies 
have incentives to exchange information to demonstrate the seriousness of their 
efforts to the Department of Justice.  State and local agencies have formed the 
Coalition for Juvenile Justice to facilitate collaborative support, and the Casey 
Foundation brings agencies together routinely.  DOJ pressures laggards to get peer 
assistance from other agencies.  Another dimension of deliberation involves 
agencies and local civic leaders and NGOs.  The design of detention alternatives 
                                                        
23  See Margo Schlanger, “Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics”, 
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, 48 (2013). 
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typically benefits from consultation with stakeholders, and some programs are most 
appropriately administered by local NGOs. 
 The type of coercion involved here is predominantly agenda-setting and 
decision-forcing.  Officials are forced to address issues to an extent greater than they 
would prefer.  They are required to act more explicitly and transparently than they 
would prefer.  And they are induced to address stakeholders they would prefer to 
ignore.  When these interventions come from courts, they are not democratic in the 
sense that the critics mean, and when they are mandated by Congress, they override 
local democracy in a way that many object to on grounds analogous to those of the 
critique.24  But if they are not democratic in origin, they are democracy-reinforcing 
in effect.  In making practice more explicit and transparent, they facilitate oversight 
in the legislative and electoral process.  At the same time, they introduce a less 
episodic and more concentrated type of accountability to stakeholders. 
 Such interventions could be defended on the ground that they typically are 
designed to protect people, such as minorities, prisoners, mental health patients, or 
children in dysfunctional families, who seem especially vulnerable in majoritarian 
political processes.  Note, however, that judicial practice in institutional reform 
cases is responsive to concerns that democracy-reinforcement arguments tend to 
underestimate the capacities of electoral institutions or to too readily translate 
substantive claims into procedural defects.  For judicial intervention only occurs 
when its proponents have demonstrated a systemic failure on the part of the 
defendant to fulfill its responsibilities. 
 Finally, structural intervention has a dimension analogous to the shifting of 
the burden of initiative in judicial review.  With conventional judicial review, the 
court’s invalidation of a statute forces proponents to resort to the political process 
to seek to re-establish their position.   This effect may also occur with structural 
decrees.  However, there is also a shifting of burdens that occurs within the lawsuit.  
We’ve noted that the court tries to avoid imposing relief directly and instead 
induces the parties to negotiate.  This is because the parties have superior 
                                                        
24  E.g., Ross Sandler and David Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree: What Happens When Courts 
Run Government (2003). 
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information and expertise.  The court’s goal is to induce them to deal with each 
other productively, and in particular, to get the defendant to engage with the 
plaintiffs.  Intervention is thus substantially indirect.  It can involve a penalty for 
failure to undertake open-ended deliberative effort or a reward for doing so.  In 
JDAI, the federal government threatens to withdraw funding for other criminal 
justice efforts when efforts to mitigate racial disparities are inadequate and both the 
government and the Casey Foundation provide grants for such efforts.  In structural 
litigation, the court threatens a penalty that neither party desires, such as closing a 
facility or holding officers in contempt, in order to induce the parties to negotiate a 
better one.     
 IV. Activism and Accountability 
 The argument of the critics is that judicial interventions based on 
controversial judgments about substantive justice are illegitimate because they are 
incompatible with democracy.  DC and DE challenge each of the three key premises 
of the argument – interventions, legitimacy, democracy. 
 Intervention.  The intervention that most engages the critics is judicial 
review, which they understand in pre-emptive terms.  In fact, even the most 
aggressive forms of judicial review are not pre-emptive in any categorical long-term 
sense.  Any case can eventually be reversed by a new corps of judges, and even in 
the short term, the practical import of a case will depend substantially on the 
actions of the other branches, social movements, and stakeholders.   
 If cases are not literally pre-emptive, they nevertheless may have political 
effects.   Two sorts of interventions can be defended in terms of the values of 
consensus and democracy that the critics invoke.  A case, such as Gideon v. 
Wainwright may consolidate an emerging consensus by imposing it on lagging 
outliers.  Or a case like Reynolds v. Sims25 (imposing the one-person/one-vote 
requirement for state legislative districting) may mandate a constitutive condition 
of democracy.  Not all the critics would agree that courts are better positioned to 
identify and vindicate consensus or democracy than legislatures.  But the argument 
                                                        
25  377 US 533 (1964). 
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would seem to require a practical analysis of actual judicial practice.  It is not 
resolved by the categorical appeals to consensus and democracy of the critique. 
 Other types of intervention have political effects that cannot be characterized 
as vindicating consensus or democratic process values.  Two such effects are 
important here.  A case may elevate an issue on the public agenda and force explicit 
decisions by officials who would prefer to ignore such matters or deal with them out 
of public view.  And a case may reverse the burden of initiative, depriving the 
beneficiaries of the status quo of the privilege of passive enjoyment.   
 Now, on one definition of democracy, a definition that some critics may 
accept, these effects are not especially troubling.  On this definition, democracy is 
not threatened by a judicial decision as long as it can be reversed by a current 
legislative majority.  It is the assumed legislative irreversibility of a decision that 
most riles the critics.  But it is not clear why they would exempt decisions that 
merely focus attention, or force decisions, or reallocate the burden of inertia.  These 
are real political effects that confer tangible advantages.  Moreover, the courts’ 
exercise of power with respect to these effects is not defensible in the majoritarian 
electoral terms that define democracy to the critics.  However, some such effects are 
inevitable in any system of adjudication where legal authority is incomplete or 
indeterminate and judicial decisions have general (for example, precedential) 
effects. 
 Democracy.  An important line of criticism would question whether the thin 
conception of democracy assumed by the critics should trump powerful substantive 
claims of injustice.  However, I put this point aside in order to focus on the key 
normative underpinning of the critics’ appeal to democracy.  They value democracy 
because it treats people equally, or at least does so more than alternative modes of 
decision-making.26  But there are many kinds of equality.  The equality the critics 
exalt is the arithmetic kind associated with voting in general elections – one 
person/one vote.  Arithmetic equality is inapposite in many contexts.  It might be 
                                                        
26  See Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review”. 
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seriously inappropriate to give arithmetically equivalent medical benefits to the sick 
and the healthy or to tax the poor and the wealthy the same amount. 
 In democracy, the objection to arithmetic equality is that it does not respond 
to the “problem of intensity”, that is, to variations in knowledge and interest.27  One 
person/one vote treats people the same without regard to the intensity of their 
interest in or knowledge about the issues.  It gives the same weight to the votes of 
those who will not be affected at all by a decision as to those whose happiness 
depends on it.  It makes no distinction between those who are barely aware of the 
issue and those who have studied and thought about it.  (Moreover, it denies any say 
to people outside the jurisdiction, no matter how much they know or care about the 
matter.)  The advantage of one-person/one-vote is that it obviates definition and 
measurement of intensity.  But the advantage comes at the cost of ignoring intensity. 
 The problem of intensity is a more general version of the problem of majority 
insensitivity to minority interests emphasized by Ely and many others.  Recognizing 
the generality of the problem has two effects.  It suggests, first, that we cannot solve 
it by carving out a special set of decisions where courts can be authorized to trump 
legislative judgments.  It also suggests that a plausible set of democratic institutions 
might combine electoral and legislative processes with others reflecting a different 
notion of equality. 
 In contrast to the majoritarian electoral processes emphasized by the critics, 
DC and DE emphasize democratic processes that are not built on arithmetic 
equality.  Both the processes of civil society opinion formation emphasized by DC 
and the processes of stakeholder deliberation emphasized in DE aspire to take 
account of intensity of interest and knowledge.  Social movements tend to allocate 
influence in proportion to effort and informally perceived efficacy, which have some 
correlation with interest and knowledge.  Stakeholder groups tend to be constituted 
through either or both administrative selection, which typically purports to focus on 
interest and knowledge, or self-selection, which has some correlation with them.  
Once constituted, they often aspire to decide by consensus and frequently require at 
                                                        
27  See Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, New Haven CN: Yale University Press 
(1956). 
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least a super-majority for decision.  There is no guarantee that either social 
movement processes or stakeholder ones will correlate influence with interest and 
knowledge, but when they succeed, they vindicate an aspect of the democratic ideal 
that conventional electoral-legislative processes do not.28 
 Legitimacy.  All the perspectives we are considering start out with the 
corrosive insights of critical modernism: The authority of history, text, and abstract 
reason is ambiguous.  In such a world, public decisions need to be grounded, at least 
substantially, in democratic process or consensus.  But DC and DE develop the idea 
of consensus differently from the critique in two key respects. 
 First, they refuse to take the institutional circumstances of consensus 
formation for granted, and they accord the courts a role in enforcing the 
preconditions of democratic consensus formation that may put them in tension with 
the electoral branches.  This puts at the center of the idea of judicial democracy-
reinforcement, as elaborated by Ely and others, not only the electoral 
representation-protecting interventions, but also deliberation-reinforcing decisions 
that protect social movements and the public forum.  It also brings to the fore the 
dimension of institutional reform decrees that compel agencies whose failures to 
respect the interests of stakeholders have been established, to engage those 
stakeholders in ways that hold out the possibility of producing local consensus that 
will guide reform. 
 Second, while for the critics, a legitimating consensus must pre-exist the 
decision, DC and DE both suggest that legitimation can come from potential 
consensus.  The suggestion seems most daring with respect to the counter-
majoritarian decisions that most concern the critics.  Here the court intervenes with 
on the basis of a substantive judgment about justice that does not have consensus 
support.  The decision does not pre-empt conclusively.  It provides a focus and 
reason for public deliberation.  It is, however, an exercise of power that biases the 
political process in favor of the proposition.   So the legitimacy of the distinctive 
                                                        
28  Of course, when they fail, they can subvert accountability and equality.  For critical analyses, 
see Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism, New York, N.Y.: W.W. Norton (1979); Jane Mansbridge, 
Beyond Adversary Democracy, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press (1980). 
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judicial practice defended by DC and DE requires a further ground.  Such a ground 
might be found in, if it occurs, the eventual acceptance of the decision across the 
political spectrum.  
 At first glance, the idea of ratification might seem a helpful analogy, but in 
fact, it is misleading.  At common law, when an agent exceeds her authority, the 
principal can make her actions effectuve by approving her initiative post hoc. 
However, the analogy is inapposite to the extent that in the conventional principal-
agent model, the principal knows what she wants when she sees it.  The ratification 
option reflects the principal’s limited ability to formulate instructions 
comprehensively ex ante.  By contrast, in Democratic Constitutionalism and 
Democratic Experimentalism, the Principal (the People) is divided and ambivalent.  
The court’s initiative leads, not to an immediate binary decision of approval or 
disapproval, but to a prolonged process of deliberation and contestation.  And if 
approval comes, the Principal may have been transformed by the process induced 
by the agent’s (court’s) initiative. 
 Moreover, in the conventional agency model, the agent’s job is to advance the 
Principal’s goals.  The judge’s job, however, is not simply to assess or even to 
anticipate the views of the People.  The judge is not a pollster.  No doubt popular 
views enter into the judge’s decision-making.  The prevalence of a social norm or 
convention may be an explicit ground of decision when relevant norms like 
reasonableness or “cruel and unusual” punishment refer to it.  In addition, everyone 
expects that judges will make tacit assessment of the likely popular and political 
reaction to their decisions.    But the deliberation-inducing role of judicial judgments 
depends in part on the premise that judgments at least in part reflect the courts 
considered views about the merits of the case.  Both Democratic Constitutionalism 
and Democratic Experimentalism understand that in hard cases, where positive 
authority is ambiguous or incomplete, judges will ground decisions in judgments 
about substantive justice.  These decisions may have authority because of 
institutional features of the courts role – independence, disinterestedness, and 
reason-giving.  But these qualities would seem relevant only to the extent the judge 
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decides on the merits.  They do not suggest that the judge would be particularly 
adept at assessing the state of popular opinion. 
 The legitimacy of the power associated with such judgments does not rest 
directly on democracy or consensus.  But both DC and DE suggest that it rests on the 
potential contribution of such judgments to the processes of democratic decision-
making and consensus formation.   So part of the legitimacy of decisions like Brown 
and the gender suspect classification cases comes after the fact.  At the moment of 
decision, legitimacy is partial and contingent.  It depends on the plausibility of its 
procedural and substantive premises.  But since at this point, the decisions are not 
adequately grounded in democracy (procedurally understood) or consensus, 
legitimacy requires more.  Some of the gap may be filled by the fact that the decision 
is open to disapproval and, eventually, rejection by coordinate institutions, the 
electorate, and civil society.  But fully grounded legitimacy depends on acceptance.29  
So legitimacy is contingent and forward-looking at the time of decision and 
retrospective at the time consensus arises.   This is a more qualified form of 
legitimacy than the critics want.  But it may be the only kind that is consistent with 
Brown and other foundational cases. 
                                                        
29  This amalgam of provisional and retrospective legitimacy for judicial decisions bears some 
resemblance to Bernard William’s idea of “moral luck” in the grounding of individual moral decisions.  
See Moral Luck, 20-39 (1981). 
